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What Can We Learn from the Uganda Revenue Authority’s Approach to 
Taxing High Net Worth Individuals?  
 
Jalia Kangave, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa, Milly Nalukwago and Patrick 
Lumala Zzimbe 
 
 
Summary 
 
Wealthy people contribute a significant share of the total revenue collected through personal 
income tax (PIT) in high-income countries. This is not the case in most low-income countries, 
where the bulk of revenue from PIT is collected from people who are in formal employment, 
especially in the public sector. In most cases, PIT is collected by employers and remitted to 
the tax authority. The problem is not an absence of laws providing for the taxation of wealthy 
individuals (commonly referred to as High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs)).  Rather, these 
laws are rarely implemented. On the one hand, this results in losses of income tax revenue, 
and, on the other, in severe inequity in the distribution of the tax burden. Successfully levying 
PIT on HNWIs requires a special organisational effort on the part of the tax authority.  
 
As far as we know, only three countries in Africa – Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda – 
have active systems in place to focus on the tax affairs of HNWIs. The Uganda Revenue 
Authority’s (URA’s) HNWI unit was set up in September 2015. Within the first year of its 
operation the unit increased revenue collection by UGX19 billion (USD5.5 million), and the 
proportion of wealthy individuals who filed income tax returns increased from 13 per cent to 
78 per cent. These improvements were registered even before the URA audited any of the 
individuals.  
 
A number of factors explain this success story. First, and most importantly, URA’s top 
management is actively engaged in and committed to the decision to tax these individuals. 
Second, once the URA obtained some information on potential HNWIs, it proceeded to act 
on its findings without waiting until it had in place a set of formal criteria for identifying these 
individuals. Most of the lessons are being learnt along the way. Third, the URA has not shied 
away from the fact that a large proportion of HNWIs are politicians or politically influential. To 
ensure that it deals with the political sensitivity of taxing these individuals, it has merged the 
HNWIs unit with its VIP unit, and placed both under the Public Sector Office, whose officials 
have experience in dealing with public figures. Fourth, there is close collaboration between 
the HNWI unit and the URA’s research department, which ensures that any 
recommendations made through research are tested in practice. Fifth, emphasis has been 
placed on officials in the HNWI unit having good communication skills. Sixth, people 
identified as HNWIs are approached initially from a perspective of educating them and 
getting their commitment to pay some taxes, rather than undertaking harsh enforcement.  
 
Keywords: personal income tax; high net worth individuals; wealthy individuals; very 
important persons; politicians; public sector office; Uganda; criteria; Uganda Revenue 
Authority.  
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7 
Introduction  
 
The governments of many low-income countries now express a strong commitment to 
enhanced domestic resource mobilisation. They have, on average, greatly reduced their 
dependence on foreign aid over the last two decades. Domestic resource mobilisation was 
the first item on the Action Agenda at the 2015 international conference on Financing for 
Development in Addis Ababa (United Nations 2015). At that conference a number of donor 
agencies and countries offered their support to strengthen the capacity of tax authorities to 
increase revenue collection (United Nations 2015; OECD 2015). Significant progress has 
been made. But there are still many challenges being faced, including the challenge of 
raising significant revenue through personal income taxes (PITs).  
 
The bulk of the revenue collected in many low-income countries comes from taxes on goods 
and services, notably Value Added Tax (VAT), and customs and excise duties. Income taxes 
often contribute a small percentage, and are largely paid by people in formal employment – 
in the public sector and a few large companies. PIT is estimated to contribute on average 10 
per cent of GDP in high-income countries, compared to 2 per cent in sub-Saharan African 
countries (excluding South Africa) (Moore and Prichard 2017). Wealthy individuals in high-
income countries account for a significant share of PIT receipts, while they pay very little in 
low-income countries. In Uganda in FY 2014/15, taxes on goods and services (including 
VAT, excise and customs duties) constituted 66 per cent of total tax revenue, while PIT 
contributed 25 per cent (OECD et al. 2017).1 People in formal employment paid most of the 
PIT (68 per cent). Taxes such as rental income tax, which one would have expected to 
generate a lot of revenue given high and increasing property values, contributed only 1 per 
cent of total PIT receipts. Most of the remaining 31 per cent of PIT was collected from 
withholding taxes on imports, supplies to government, dividends, professional fees and non-
residents. Ultimately, employees have borne and continue to bear most of the burden of PIT. 
This results in severe inequity in distribution of the tax burden.  
 
Various explanations have been given for the underperformance of income taxes in low-
income countries. These include weaknesses in tax administration, entrenched power 
structures, corruption and inappropriate transfers of tax systems from high-income to low-
income countries (Keen 2012). Most, if not all, of these factors hinder PIT collection in 
Uganda. There is also arguably a historical explanation for the underperformance of PIT in 
the country. As is the case in the rest of East Africa, PIT in Uganda was originally designed 
for Europeans and Asians. When the tax was introduced in 1940, it was only imposed on 
non-Africans (Kwagala-Igaga 2013; Therkildsen 2006). Africans continued to be subject to 
the poll tax (imposed on adult men who owned huts), which was subsequently replaced by 
the graduated tax (a local government tax imposed on able-bodied men above the age of 18 
and women in gainful employment). Even though the law was subsequently amended to 
impose PIT on all taxpayers irrespective of their race, in practice very few individuals were 
accustomed to paying it. Similarly, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) put little effort into 
enforcing PIT, and relied mostly on withholding agents such as employers, and, to a lesser 
extent, companies (to withhold taxes from the payment of dividends).  
 
Wealthy individuals in Uganda have historically paid little PIT. For FY 2013/14, for example, 
only 5 per cent of directors of the top taxpaying companies were paying income taxes, with 
some paying as little as USD5. Similarly, a sample of the top 60 lawyers in the country 
revealed that less than a third were remitting PIT for the period between FY 2011/12 and FY 
2013/14. There was also a mismatch between payment of import duties and compliance with 
income tax obligations. Some individuals were paying billions of Uganda shillings in import 
duty, but not paying any income taxes. Lastly, an analysis of the compliance of 71 top 
                                                 
1  The figures relate to taxes collected by central government, excluding social security contributions.  
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government officials over the period 2011/12 to 2013/14 revealed that, although all of them 
had stakes in commercial enterprises, the majority were not paying PIT. Neither were the 
companies that they were associated with complying with their tax obligations (Kangave et 
al. 2016). 
 
The under-taxation of wealthy individuals is not confined to Uganda or low-income countries 
more generally. Rhere are concerns that wealthy individuals in high-income countries do not 
pay their fair share in taxes because of issues such as aggressive tax planning and 
significant tax cuts (Piketty et al. 2014; OECD 2009). The tax affairs of wealthy individuals 
globally are increasingly being put under scrutiny for various reasons (OECD 2009). These 
individuals could contribute significantly to revenue collection. They are especially likely to 
engage in aggressive tax planning. The compliance behaviour of this group of taxpayers is 
likely to have a bearing on the behaviour of other taxpayers, and thus on the integrity of the 
tax system as a whole.  
 
Successfully taxing wealthy individuals requires a special organisational effort on the part of 
tax authorities. Tax authorities are increasingly targeting them, particularly in rich countries 
(OECD 2009; ATAF 2017).2 The methods used vary from country to country. They include: 
setting up dedicated units to manage their tax affairs; paying special attention to the tax 
returns of larger companies in which HNWIs have significant shareholdings; and appointing 
officials in different departments within the tax authority to deal specifically with the affairs of 
HNWIs. To the best of our knowledge only three countries in Africa have specific active 
mechanisms for dealing with HNWIs: Mauritius, South Africa, and now Uganda.  
 
Uganda’s HNWI unit was set up in September 2015. At the end of the first year of operation, 
it had collected over UGX19 billion (USD5.5 million). Only 13 per cent of the 117 people 
initially identified as HNWIs had been filing income tax returns at the beginning of that year. 
By the end of the year, 78 per cent were filing.  
 
What explains the URA’s success in such a short period of time? What should the URA do to 
ensure that this success is sustained? What can the URA learn from other tax authorities? 
And what can other tax authorities learn from the URA’s experience? To answer these 
questions, in Section 1 we document the steps that the URA has undertaken so far to tax 
HNWIs. We highlight the benefits that have resulted in Section 2. This is followed in Section 
3 by an analysis of the similarities and differences between the URA’s approach and the 
approaches of three other tax authorities: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in 
the UK, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO). We selected the ATO because it has one of the longest histories of dealing with 
HNWIs. We chose SARS, because it is one of only three tax authorities in Africa that has an 
active system in place to focus on the affairs of HNWIs. Lastly, we selected HMRC because 
of the collaboration between HMRC and URA on a number of tax issues. We later 
discovered that HMRC is the only one of the three that has a dedicated unit to deal with the 
affairs of HNWIs.3 While SARS and the ATO have systems in place to tax HNWIs, none of 
these are organised as special units. In Section 4, we discuss how the URA can improve the 
performance of its HNWI unit by learning from the experiences of HMRC, SARS and the 
ATO. We conclude our discussion in Section 5, by listing the lessons that other tax 
authorities can learn from the URA’s experience.  
                                                 
2  Taxpayer segmentation is a major feature of modern tax administration. Historically, tax authorities were structured 
along tax types. However, tax type structures had many disadvantages, including promoting unhealthy competition 
among different tax offices to obtain taxes from the same taxpayers, failure to share information relating to the 
taxpayers, and high transaction costs for taxpayers who had to deal with different tax offices (Moore 2013). Segmenting 
along taxpayer type has enabled revenue authorities to concentrate scarce resources on a small number of taxpayers 
who have complex transactions (e.g. large companies and HNWIs), and deploy less skilled staff on more routine tasks. 
3  In addition to comparative analysis with the three revenue authorities, we conducted interviews with officials in the URA 
(within and outside Kampala), Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Ministry of Finance), tax 
practitioners and a Member of Parliament. We also sat in on a meeting held by URA officials with prospective HNWIs.  
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1  The URA’s approach to taxing HNWIs 
 
Following a study conducted by the authors of this paper, in September 2015 the URA 
established an HNWI unit as part of the Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) in the Domestic Taxes 
Department. The unit was staffed with five officials (four tax officers and a supervisor). To 
begin their work, the officials generated a list of potential HNWIs, comprising directors of 
large companies under the LTO and individuals whose wealth was publicly known. The list 
was scrutinised by top management in the Domestic Taxes Department, who made revisions 
on the basis of their own knowledge. Given that most of the individuals selected were not 
filing income tax returns, the URA did not at that point have records that it could use to 
ascertain the accuracy of the list. Further, the URA did not have any formal criteria for 
defining HNWIs. The initial list comprised 117 people. The HNWI unit staff then contacted 
them by telephone to set up appointments to talk about their tax affairs. The officials 
gathered as much information as they could from their databases about the economic assets 
and transactions of these individuals before the meetings. The URA was often represented 
by the supervisor of the unit and a tax officer at the meetings. In some cases the URA’s 
Commissioner General and Commissioner of Domestic Taxes accompanied the team. The 
meetings were intended to serve two broader purposes: to educate the taxpayers of their 
rights and obligations, and to signal that the URA was looking into their tax affairs.  
 
The HNWI list included a number of politicians. Shortly before the 2016 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the URA approached the Electoral Commission and requested that 
they should require a tax clearance certificate from the URA before accepting nominations 
from candidates for parliamentary seats. The Electoral Commission had no legal authority to 
insist on this requirement, and so it did not make the announcement itself. However, the 
URA, through the Domestic Taxes Department, made public announcements and sent out 
text messages and emails to members of the public stating in part: ‘If you intend to contest in 
the upcoming national elections, you need to obtain a Tax Clearance Certificate addressed 
to the Electoral Commission. To obtain a Tax Clearance Certificate, you will need to ensure 
that all your returns are filed and any tax due is paid’.4  
 
Almost all candidates went to the URA to apply for the clearance. Before issuing clearance 
the URA insisted on evidence of filing returns, and required the candidates to make at least 
some payment towards what they owed. In the first month of introducing this rule, URA was 
able to raise approximately UGX380 million (USD110,000) from the aspiring members of 
parliament (Interview with URA official).  
 
In January 2017 the HNWI unit was moved from the Large Taxpayers Office to the Public 
Sector Office (PSO), where it was merged with the VIP unit that had been established in July 
2015 to deal with the affairs of individuals who were considered by the URA to be politically 
influential.5 The HNWI/VIP unit currently has six staff, and responsibility for the tax affairs of 
326 individuals. The decision to merge the units was driven by two main factors. First, a 
number of individuals on the HNWI register were also VIPs. Of the original 117 HNWIs 
identified, 21 per cent were VIPs and 11 per cent former VIPs. Second, the URA observed 
that there were other similarities or overlaps: both groups tend to be politically or 
economically influential, and have very busy lifestyles. The skills required to interact with 
                                                 
4  <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/ec-explains -ura-tax-certificates-for-aspirants>. 
5  Individuals dealt with by the VIP unit are divided into two broad categories. The first consists of government officials , 
such as the president of Uganda, the vice president, cabinet ministers, high ranking judicial officers, the speaker and 
deputy speaker of parliament, heads of political parties, heads of government institutions, the inspector general of 
police, the chief of defence forces, members of parliament that head committees , and executive directors of public 
entities. The second category is made up of individuals who are not government officials but are considered to be 
influential, including kingdom heads, heads of professional associations, heads of business associations, religious 
leaders, and outspoken individuals such as influential journalists.  
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them and manage their affairs are quite similar (Interview with URA official). It was more 
efficient to handle them through one office.  
 
It is important to provide some background about the PSO itself to understand the rationale 
behind putting the newly merged unit under the PSO. It was established in September 2014 
to handle the tax affairs of government ministries, departments, agencies and local 
authorities (Uganda Revenue Authority 2016). Previously, the affairs of most of these 
government organisations (except local government) were managed by the Large Taxpayers 
Office.6 The URA set up the PSO for various reasons: 
 
 Government employs a significant proportion of the population, so it was important to 
ensure that government was paying taxes on the income of its employees. 
 Government is also one of the biggest consumers of goods and services. However, many 
of its suppliers were not registered with the URA. 
 The government regularly concludes contracts with local and foreign contractors in which 
it undertakes to pay all or part of the taxes due – or exempts transactions from taxes 
entirely. These contracts are not always known to the URA, particularly in cases where 
the contractors use different registration details from those contained in their Tax 
Identification Number (TIN) certificates. 
 The government is one of the biggest tenants and landlords in the country. A number of 
those who let out their property to the government are not registered with the URA. Some 
of these property owners are government officials.  
 
The PSO is thus tasked with a number of functions including: 
 
 Advising government organisations about their tax obligations, and educating them on 
the functions and departments of the URA. 
 Maintaining an up-to-date database of relevant government organisations. 
 Monitoring and ensuring that government organisations are up-to-date with their filing and 
payment obligations. 
 
As at June 2017, the PSO was responsible for 948 taxpayers consisting of VIPs, HNWIs and 
government agencies (Table 1).  
 
 Table 1 Tax register for PSO as at end of June 2017 
PSO register Number % 
VIPs 209 22 
HNWIs 117 12 
Public sector organisations 622 65 
Total 948 100 
Source: URA database 
 
The PSO is headed by a manager and has 25 staff members, including supervisors, tax 
officers and support staff. 
 
  
                                                 
6  The tax affairs of local government agencies were handled by local offices of the URA.  
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Figure 1 Structure of the PSO 
 
 
There were a number of reasons for the decision to put the merged HNWI/VIP unit under the 
PSO: 
 
 Some of the taxpayers concerned are politically influential figures. It is important that they 
are dealt with by officials who have experience in dealing with politicians. There is also 
some history associated with this. Before the URA was established as a separate, semi-
autonomous tax authority in 1991, there was a VIP unit under the Ministry of Finance 
(Interview with URA official). This unit was formed after a junior officer wrote a letter to 
the president, inviting him to go to the revenue office to make some declarations 
regarding his tax affairs. This raised a lot of concern. The Minister of Finance was 
required to explain the behaviour of the junior officers. A VIP unit was then established so 
that government officials above a certain rank would be dealt with by high-ranking tax 
officers. However, the VIP unit was not transferred when the URA was established. It was 
not until 2015 that the URA decided it was important to have a special unit for these 
individuals to ensure that their tax affairs were handled with the level of confidentiality 
that the URA felt was necessary (Kangave et al. 2016).  
 The URA management felt that, for the Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) to operate more 
efficiently, it needed to be freed of responsibility for taxpayer segments that did not fit well 
within its operations. Since its establishment most of the work of the LTO had focused on 
large companies. Little attention had been paid to government organisations or HNWIs. 
The establishment of the PSO provided an opportunity to simplify the operations of the 
LTO, by moving responsibility for government organisations and HNWIs to a more 
appropriate office.  
 Even before the HNWI/VIP unit was transferred to it, the PSO had registered 
considerable success in managing the affairs of a politically sensitive group of taxpayers 
(i.e. government organisations). The revenue collected by the PSO grew by 194 per cent 
in FY 2015/16, and 106 per cent in FY 2016/17. While the LTO collects more domestic 
revenue than any other office within the URA, the PSO is now second. It collected 4.5 per 
cent of domestic revenue in FY 2014/15, and 17.3 per cent in FY 2016/17.  
 
Now that the HNWI/VIP unit is in place and various lessons have been learnt over the past 
couple of years, the URA is working on formal criteria for identifying HNWIs. The authors of 
Manager PSO
1 manager
Supervisor HNW/VIP, 
self-accounting
8 officers
Supervisor enforcement 
and reporting
8 officers
Supervisor compliance 
audits
4 officers
Admin/office attendant 
and driver
1 adm, 2 drivers & 1 office 
attendant 
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this paper worked closely with URA’s top management (particularly in the Domestic Taxes 
Department) and officials in the HNWI/VIP unit to develop the criteria. Since most potential 
HNWIs are not yet filing tax returns, and keeping in mind that many of them operate 
informally,7 we propose multiple income and wealth thresholds, comprising both core and 
non-core parameters. A core parameter is an indicator which is individually sufficient to 
trigger classification as an HNWI. Any two non-core parameters generate the same result 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Criteria for identifying HNWIs in Uganda 
 
 
These parameters have been developed bearing in mind a number of factors: 
 
1. Land and buildings. While property plays a central role in the economies of many low-
income countries (particularly in Africa), very little is collected from the taxation of 
property (Goodfellow 2015; Piracha and Moore 2015; Jibao and Prichard 2013). Land 
and buildings are the most common assets used by individuals to amass and retain 
wealth in Uganda (Murangira 2014). The revenue so far collected from taxing HNWIs in 
Uganda demonstrates the central role of property in the country’s economy. 
Approximately 45 per cent of the taxes collected from HNWIs since the establishment of 
the unit came from property rental income. Similarly, out of all the revenue that has been 
                                                 
7  We use the term ‘informal’ cautiously to refer primarily to the challenges that countries such as Uganda face in 
accessing taxpayer information or coordinating information that is in the hands of third parties. As we have noted 
elsewhere, there is ‘a large informal sector within the formal sector. By this we mean that there are many professionals 
– both in the private and public sector – who may pay taxes on their employment income and/or importation of goods, 
but take advantage of the loopholes created by the informal sector to undertake additional lucrative commercial 
enterprises on which they do not pay taxes’ (Kangave et al. 2016: 12). 
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collected from VIPs so far, rental income tax constitutes 86 per cent (URA databases, 
2017).  
2. Shareholding in large companies or groups of companies with high turnover. Our 
research revealed that large companies whose tax affairs are managed by the LTO are 
typically controlled by a small group of individuals.8 Most of these individuals have 
significant shares in more than one company. There are also individuals who control 
groups of companies that are under the Medium Taxpayers Office. It is often difficult to 
separate the private affairs of wealthy individuals from those of their companies 
(Interviews with URA officials and tax practitioners). Shareholders are often also the 
directors of their companies. Company transactions are often mingled with the private 
affairs of business owners. For example, company money is sometimes used to pay 
personal expenses (such as school fees for directors’ children and funding their private 
travel). These expenses are normally declared as general expenses in the business 
accounts. As one URA official stated: ‘The company is the individual. The signatory of the 
company bank account is one person. The board meetings are influenced by one 
individual. The same individual takes company money and uses it for personal effects 
such as constructing or renovating their homes’.  
Many wealthy individuals invest through associates, such as children, spouses or pseudo 
business partners, who become the face of the company but in reality have little control 
over company decisions (Interviews with URA officials). It is thus important to scrutinise 
the affairs of the associates of HNWIs. Section 3 of the Income Tax Act defines an 
associate as any person who, not being an employee, acts in accordance with the 
directions, requests, suggestions or wishes of another person, whether or not they are in 
a business relationship. An associate could be a relative of the individual, a business 
partner, a partnership in which the person is a partner, a trustee of a trust under which 
the person benefits and a company in which the person – either alone or with associates 
– controls 50 per cent or more of the voting power in the company.  
3. Loans and bank deposits. As one tax practitioner said: ‘You do not get a huge loan from 
a bank unless you have sufficient assets to show that you will be able to pay the money 
back’. While wealthy individuals rarely declare their income to the URA and other 
government agencies, many of them provide banks with information relating to their 
assets in order to obtain loans (Interviews with URA officials and tax practitioners). Loans 
thus serve as a useful proxy for income and assets. Similarly, huge deposits on bank 
accounts are a useful indicator of wealth. In an interview in a URA office outside 
Kampala, staff told us of a farmer who approached the URA to apply for a tax 
identification number because he wanted to obtain a tax clearance certificate to bid for a 
government tender. One of the documents he submitted was a bank statement which 
indicated that he had UGX2.6 billion (USD742,857) in his bank account. The farmer had 
been in business for several years but had never registered for tax purposes. It is also 
common knowledge that several traders operating ‘small’ shops in the downtown 
Kampala area bank hundreds of millions of shillings on a daily basis.9 Yet the URA is 
unable to establish the extent of their wealth because many of them do not keep proper 
books of accounts. The URA has made proposals to government requesting access to 
bank information. These proposals are still being discussed. 
4. Publically known wealthy individuals. The identity of many HNWIs is publically known. 
This information can be gleaned from URA officials, members of the public, newspapers 
and lifestyle magazines. However, we categorise public knowledge as a non-core 
parameter because, on its own, this information is insufficient to confirm wealth. We also 
                                                 
8  We use the word ‘control’ in the manner in which it is used in Uganda’s Income Tax Act Cap 340, to mean having at 
least 50 per cent of the voting power in the company. This control can be exercised either directly or indirectly through 
associates, other companies, partnerships or trusts.  
9  The physical size of the shops is often small, with very few employees. However, for some of these traders  turnover is in 
billions of Uganda shillings per year.  
  
14 
put professionals under this category, because some of the wealthy ones are publicly 
known. 
5. Imports and exports. Just as land is an important form of amassing wealth in Uganda, 
international trade (particularly importation) is a lucrative business. As at FY 2016/17, 
exports constituted 11 per cent of GDP, while imports were 17 per cent of GDP (Ministry 
of Finance 2017). Some individuals import goods worth billions of Uganda shillings and 
pay large amounts of money in import duties, but are not registered for income tax 
(Kangave et al. 2016). Information about exports and imports can be readily obtained 
from the URA’s Customs Department.  
6. Farmers with high-value commercial forests, plantations and ranches. Uganda is largely 
an agricultural economy. Agriculture contributes 26 per cent to GDP (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 2015). While the majority of farmers operate on a small scale, there are a good 
number of individuals operating on a very large scale. An increasingly lucrative business 
for the wealthy is the maintenance of commercial forests, which are sold for carbon 
credits. By 2013, for example, privately owned forests occupied 2.3 million hectares (NFA 
2013). Most of this forest land is owned by a few individuals. Similarly, in regions such as 
western Uganda, livestock and banana farming are a major source of income and wealth. 
A URA official in an office outside Kampala informed us, for example, of an individual 
who owns 6 ranches, each with over 6,000 cattle. Another interviewee from the Kampala 
Capital City Authority, referring to the same individual said, ‘Each ranch of this individual 
is worth over a billion shillings’. 
 
Having developed these criteria, URA management had one more question for the 
researchers: ‘Based on these criteria, who are the HNWIs?’ The researchers checked 
various URA databases using the criteria to answer this question. We found many potential 
HNWIs who are not among the 117 originally identified. Many HNWIs are VIPs (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Analysis of potential HNWIs using the proposed criteria  
Details Yardstick Potential 
HNWIs 
Already 
on HNWI 
register 
Already on 
VIP 
register 
Not on 
HNW/VIP 
register 
Shares Shareholders in companies with turnover 
greater than UGX50 bn or USD14.29 mn 
493 13 5 475 
Multiple shareholding in companies with 
turnover ranging from UGX15 to 50 bn or 
USD4.29 to 14.29 mn 
36 4 0 32 
Commercial 
buildings 
Generates rental income greater than 
UGX500 mn or USD0.14 mn per year 
163 49 010 114 
Land Land transactions worth UGX1 bn or 
USD0.29 mn and above in the last 5 years  
197 8 2 187 
Motor vehicles Vehicle(s) with total value above UGX500 
mn or USD0.14 mn both individually or in 
aggregate 
109 12 7 90 
Imports and 
exports by 
individuals' TINs11 
Imports worth UGX500 mn or USD0.14 mn 
per year 
83 3 0 80 
Exports worth UGX500 mn or USD0.14 mn 
per year 
22 0 0 22 
Source: Authors’ computations based on URA databases 
  
                                                 
10  Most of the revenue from VIPs (86%) is from rental income tax, but none of them declared rental income greater than 
UGX500 mn. 
11  Some individuals import/export using company TINs. This information relates to those importing/exporting using 
personal TINs.  
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2  Achievements of the URA’s HNWI/VIP 
unit  
  
While the HNWI unit has only been established for two years, it has already registered 
impressive success. Below we list its achievements. 
 
2.1  Profiles of HNWI/VIPs and an updated register 
 
The URA paid very little attention to the tax affairs of individuals before the unit was 
established. The LTO had a register of 737 taxpayers, out of whom only 17 were individuals 
(Kangave et al. 2016). The majority of those individuals declared only the income they 
obtained from employment. There is now a register of 117 HNWIs and 239 VIPs. With the 
newly compiled register, the HNWI team has revised the registration details of all the 
individuals to include other sources of income.  
 
2.2  Filing of tax returns  
 
There is great improvement in the filing of income tax returns by HNWIs. Many of the 
individuals had never filed an income tax return. Only about 13 per cent of the individuals in 
the LTO were filing returns before the HNWI unit was set up. At least 78 per cent of HNWIs 
and 65 per cent of VIPs were filing returns by FY 2015/16.  
 
2.3  Revenue collection 
 
The HNWI unit was established in September 2015. By the end of June 2016, the unit had 
collected over UGX19 billion (USD5.5 million) in rental tax, personal income tax, VAT and 
stamp duty. This was a significant increase when compared to the UGX1.35 billion 
(USD390,000) that was collected from individuals in the LTO in FY 2014/15. In total, 
UGX40.05 billion (USD11.44 million) had been collected as at June 2017.  
 
Table 3 Revenue collection from HNWIs as at end June 2017 
Tax head FY2015/16 FY2016/17 Grand total 
Rental 9,678,619,886 7,306,044,119 16,984,664,005 
Income tax 5,833,116,720 5,793,580,255 11,626,696,975 
VAT 3,297,085,469 7,291,237,447 10,588,322,916 
PAYE 370,331,167 484,931,799 855,262,966 
Total 19,179,153,242 20,875,793,620 40,054,946,862 
Source: URA database 
 
In the first half of 2015/16, when the unit had just started its operations, 45 per cent of the taxes 
collected from HNWIs were from rental income, while for VIPs rental income taxes contributed 
86 per cent of total collection.  
 
Table 4 Revenue contribution for HNWIs and VIPs for first half of FY 2015/16 
  HNWIs VIPs 
Rental Income tax 45% 86% 
Individual income tax 33% 13% 
 VAT 20% 1% 
PAYE 2% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on 2015/16 half year revenue collection statistics 
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2.4  Improved voluntary compliance 
  
In addition to increased revenue and improvement in filing of returns, the URA has noticed 
an improvement in the attitude of HNWIs/VIPs towards paying taxes. Specifically, they have 
noticed that, for some, non-compliance was due to a lack of understanding of their tax 
obligations. Similarly, some of the individuals approached appear to have influenced the 
compliance of other individuals within their networks. For example, one of the business 
people that the URA met in the initial stages of the operation of the unit informed URA of 
their wider business network, some of whom have now improved their compliance. Similarly, 
one of the prominent pastors in Kampala city who is on the VIP list was reported as having 
told his church congregation that they should start paying their taxes. This was after the 
HNWI/VIP team paid him a visit and sensitised him about his taxpaying obligations. As 
HNWI/VIP unit officials pay more visits to taxpayers and communicate not just the rights and 
obligations of taxpayers, but also a willingness on the part of the URA to assist taxpayers in 
managing their tax affairs, some taxpayers get a more positive perception of the URA.  
 
2.5  Compliance audits of HNWIs 
 
In FY 2016/17, the URA conducted comprehensive audits on the accounts of five individuals 
on the HNWI register. Over UGX1.48 billion (USD490,000) was assessed and agreed upon 
with the taxpayers, as shown below.  
 
Tax head Audit yield (UGX) 
Income tax 760,999,221 
VAT 510,388,567 
Rental 213,370,720 
Total assessed and agreed 1,484,758,508 
 
 
3  How is the URA’s approach to taxing 
HNWIs similar to or different from that of 
other tax authorities? 
 
The URA’s approach to taxing HNWIs is similar to that of the British, South African and 
Australian tax authorities in two main respects: 
 
1. All three tax authorities had at some point in time special units dedicated to handling the 
affairs of HNWIs. The HMRC’s HNWI unit was established in 2009 and is still in operation 
(National Audit Office 2016). The South African Revenue Service (SARS) operated an 
HNWI unit between 2009 and 2014, after which the unit was closed because SARS 
restructured the whole organisation to operate along functional lines (Interview with 
SARS officials, 2016).12 The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) established a High Wealth 
Individuals (HWI) Taskforce in 1996 to monitor and conduct compliance reviews of 
HNWIs (ATO response to questionnaire, 2016). The taskforce was disbanded in 2011. 
The affairs of HNWIs are now handled through ATO’s Privately Owned and Wealth 
Groups (POWGs), which deal generally with wealthy individuals and the companies they 
                                                 
12  Organisation by function is one of the modern systems of tax administration. Under this structure the revenue authority 
is organised around different functions, such as taxpayer registration, audit and investigation, legal affairs, investigation 
and debt collection (see Moore 2013). 
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control. While SARS and ATO no longer have special units that strictly handle HNWI 
affairs, they still have systems in place to monitor the affairs of these individuals closely. 
2. Many indicators of wealth (e.g. property, shareholding, professional services and luxury 
items like cars) used by the URA are similar to those used by the other three tax 
authorities. One indicator in particular is worth mentioning. The URA’s proposed criteria 
of including company shareholding as a core parameter for identifying HNWIs is similar to 
Australia’s approach of handling the affairs of wealthy individuals through POWGs. The 
ATO resorted to this strategy because it observed that wealthy individuals controlled 
large complex groups of entities, and it was difficult to divorce the individuals from the 
entities. The ATO thus takes a ‘group wealth approach’, which enables it to assess the 
wealth of HNWIs through some of the most successful businesses in the country. For 
example, 379 HNWIs have controlling interests in more than 50 entities per individual 
(ATO response to questionnaire, 2016). The Ugandan situation is likely similar.  
 
There are also a number of differences between the URA’s approach and that of the other tax 
authorities: 
 
1. Unlike the URA, the other three tax authorities use a single threshold based on aggregate 
income and/or wealth. In the URA’s case there are multiple thresholds, which depend on 
the parameter that is being used. The URA uses multiple thresholds for three main 
reasons. First, information about economic activities is sometimes not officially recorded. 
It is quite common to have wealthy individuals whose businesses are not registered with 
government organisations. Second, even where such information is recorded, the 
information systems in the different government organisations rarely interface. A few 
government organisations, particularly outside Kampala, still rely on manual records. This 
makes it difficult to collate the information. Third, many transactions are undertaken using 
cash, and are thus difficult to trace. In the end, the URA is operating in an environment in 
which access to information poses a great challenge. This makes it difficult to aggregate 
the wealth/income of a taxpayer, at least at present.  
2. As mentioned above, instead of having dedicated units for handling the affairs of HNWIs, 
SARS and ATO now manage the affairs of these individuals using different mechanisms. 
In SARS, following a restructuring of the organisation in 2014, the affairs of HNWIs 
started to be handled by the various functional departments (e.g. taxpayer services, 
accounts, compliance, case selection and audit). Instead of having a separate unit for 
HNWIs, there are tax officials in each of the new departments who are assigned to deal 
specifically with HNWIs. There is also a function known as the Taxpayer Strategy, which 
is tasked with drafting policies for enhancing the compliance of HNWIs, and ensuring that 
there is coordination of the affairs of these individuals between the different departments 
(Interview with SARS officials, 2016). In the ATO, the affairs of wealthy individuals are 
dealt with across compliance teams that handle the broader POWG population.13 While 
there is no dedicated unit to deal solely with the individuals, the POWG monitors their 
affairs closely and reviews all high-risk wealthy individuals over a three-year cycle.  
3. Unlike the other three tax authorities, URA’s approach explicitly includes politicians as 
HNWIs. There are no politicians on the HNWI register in South Africa (Interview with 
SARS officials, 2016). A separate unit (the Politically Influential Unit) deals with 
politicians. HNWIs for SARS’s purposes are thus private individuals. We asked the ATO: 
‘Have you had to deal with HNWIs who are influential public figures, such as politicians? 
If so, what has been your experience dealing with them? How have you handled any 
challenges resulting from their political influence?’ The ATO responded: ‘Yes, high profile 
taxpayers are treated the same way as ordinary taxpayers – impartially and according to 
                                                 
13  POWGs consist of three taxpayer categories: private groups (economic groups with a turnover of more than AUD2 
million); wealthy Australians (resident Australian individuals who, together with their associates, control wealth of 
between AUD5 million and AUD30 million); and high wealth individuals (resident Australian individuals who, together 
with their associates, control wealth of at least AUD30 million). 
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the law’. It is one thing to have a provision in the law that provides for the taxation of all 
individuals and quite another to enforce that provision. Success in implementing laws 
differs from one country to another. Enforcement is even more precarious when powerful 
individuals, such as politicians, are being targeted.14 URA found that unless it deliberately 
included politicians in its strategy, it would be difficult to collect taxes from them.  
 
 
4  What lessons can the URA learn from other 
tax authorities? 
 
There are various lessons that the URA can learn from HMRC, ATO and SARS. We divide 
these into two broad categories: staffing requirements and encouraging voluntary 
compliance.  
 
4.1  Staffing requirements 
 
There are three issues relating to human resources that the URA needs to address: the ratio 
of tax staff to taxpayers, staff development and staff continuity.  
 
4.1.1 Staff/taxpayer ratio 
 
The HNWI/VIP unit has 6 staff members serving a total of 326 individuals. This puts the staff 
to taxpayer ratio at 1:54. With the newly developed criteria, the number of HNWIs is certain 
to increase. The current ratio is already relatively high when compared to HMRC’s HNWI 
unit, for example. As at 2015/16, HMRC’s unit had approximately 380 staff members 
handling the tax affairs of 6,500 HNWIs, bringing the ratio of staff to taxpayers to 1:17 
(National Audit Office 2016). In addition, each HNWI in HMRC has a customer relationship 
manager who is responsible for understanding the behaviour of the individual, the risks 
associated with them and their business transactions. As at 2015/16, there were about 40 
customer relationship managers.  
 
We are aware that the shortage in human resources is not unique to the HNWI/VIP unit of 
URA. The organisation is generally understaffed. In a recent study of 15 tax authorities 
conducted by the African Tax Administration Forum, URA was ranked as the second most 
understaffed tax authority (after the Burundi Revenue Authority), with the population to tax 
administrator ratio being over 6,000:1 (African Tax Administration Forum 2016).15 Almost all 
the other tax authorities had a ratio of less than 4,000:1. Internal URA records reveal that in 
FY 2015/16 the overall staff to taxpayer ratio was 1:373. It was worse for the domestic tax 
auditors, where the number of auditors to taxpayers stood at 1:4,319.  While staffing is 
clearly a challenge in the URA generally, there is a strong case for increasing its human 
resources given the potential for revenue increase demonstrated by the HNWI/VIP unit. 
Initially, this can be achieved through staff movements from other departments. However, 
there will be a need to recruit externally in the long term given the overall staff shortage.  
 
  
                                                 
14  e.g. In November 2016 Uganda’s Members of Parliament passed a bill in which they exempted themselves from paying 
income taxes on their allowances, despite the fact that a court had just ruled that those allowances should be subjected 
to tax. See Parliament of Uganda, ‘Parliament passes Income Tax Bill, justifies tax exemptions on allowances’ 
<http://www.parliament.go.ug/index.php/about-parliament/parliamentary-news/1037-parliament-passes-income-tax-bill -
justifies-tax-exemptions-on-allowances>.  
15  This ratio takes into account both potential and registered taxpayers.  
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4.1.2 Staff development 
 
While the manager of the PSO and the supervisor of the HNWI/VIP unit both have vast 
experience in tax issues and working in the URA,16 the majority of officials in the unit are 
relatively junior. Two of the officers have seven years of experience working in the URA, 
while the remaining four are previous graduate trainees who have less than five years of 
experience (Interview with URA officials). The new focus on HNWIs is likely to result in these 
individuals getting tax advisors to help them manage their affairs. The URA will need to 
match this expertise. Some of this expertise can be obtained within the URA.17  
 
One of the reasons why SARS has achieved considerable success in taxing HNWIs is 
because it uses technically competent auditors who are attached to the cases of specific 
HNWIs (Interview with SARS officials, 2016). Some of these auditors were recruited from the 
private sector. The URA should look into recruiting experienced tax advisors from audit firms 
and law firms.  
 
There is also a need for training through a mixture of on-the-job training, short courses 
geared toward addressing specific needs, informal networking events and secondments to 
other revenue authorities (OECD 2009). In SARS, for example, junior auditors were exposed 
to complex tax planning schemes as soon as they started working with the HNWI unit to build 
the capacity of lower-level staff (Interview with SARS officials 2016). In addition, these 
officers frequently met their more experienced counterparts to discuss the various cases 
being handled by the unit. In addition to on-the-job training, URA needs a well-structured 
programme for cadre development, including using ex-URA officials to pass on their skills to 
more junior staff (Interview with officials in the Ministry of Finance). Lastly, the OECD has 
recommended that where a revenue authority is not able to hire from the private sector, 
regular dialogue and interaction with the advisors of HNWIs can increase officials’ 
understanding of the business of the taxpayer (OECD 2009).  
 
4.1.3 Staff continuity 
 
One of the challenges to building capacity in the URA is the constant transfer of officials from 
one office to another (Interviews with URA officials). Staff members are transferred just as 
they are beginning to understand their new roles. In some cases resources have been spent 
on external training of an official for a specific role, and the training is not directly applicable 
to their new role. Since the establishment of the HNWI unit, the supervisors have been 
changed three times, and some officers have been moved to other offices. This is a high 
turnover considering the unit is only two years old. However, one senior official explained 
that rotation within the URA occurs for various reasons. Sometimes, there is a need for more 
human resources in a particular department, but the URA does not have the funds to recruit 
new staff. At other times, officials are moved because they have served at a station for so 
long that they are at risk of being compromised. It should also be remembered that there was 
a lot of experimenting with different ideas in the initial stages of establishing the HNWI unit; 
this is reflected in the staff changes and even the merger of the VIP/HNWI units.  
 
However, for the purposes of building capacity, it will be important in future that there is some 
continuity in the staff attached to the unit. Movements do not only affect capacity building. 
They also disrupt the relationship that has been built between URA staff and HNWIs.  
                                                 
16  The manager of the PSO has been in the URA since it was established, and has served in various departments and 
capacities. Before URA’s establishment, he worked in the revenue office in the Ministry of Finance. The supervisor has 
worked with the URA for 11 years, has experience in dealing with public officials, and is firm in her approach.  
17  While the majority of the URA’s staff members (41%) have less than five years of working experience, there are also a 
significant number that have long-term working experience: 20% have worked for between 5-9 years; 28% between 10-
19 years and 11% have at least 20 years’ experience. (These statistics relate to working with the URA. The URA has 
been the only employer for many officials).  
  
20 
The risk of being compromised as a result of constant interaction between tax officials and 
HNWIs should be monitored. In 2017, the UK’s Public Accounts Committee raised questions 
about HMRC’s seemingly cosy relationship with HNWIs, arguing that having customer 
relationship managers gave the impression that HNWIs receive favourable treatment 
(Committee of Public Accounts 2017). HMRC responded that while HNWIs appeared to be 
treated favourably, they also received more scrutiny than most other taxpayers. To manage 
the risks associated with taxpayers or their agents working closely with customer relationship 
managers, the HMRC puts a number of checks in place: 
 
 HNWIs are rotated between teams 
 Customer relationship managers work with a team of 17 other staff members 
 Customer relationship managers are not solely responsible for signing off key decisions 
such as whether to open an inquiry into an HNWI. These decisions are signed off by a 
staff member outside the team 
 Disputes relating to an HNWI’s case are handled by the HMRC’s dispute settlement 
mechanisms; customer relationship managers who have been central to the enquiry 
cannot approve the settlement.  
 
The URA can learn from HMRC’s approach by putting mechanisms in place to check the 
independence of officials working in the unit, while ensuring that there is continuity of staff.  
 
4.2  Encouraging voluntary compliance 
 
To sustain the success of the HNWI/VIP unit, the URA needs to put mechanisms in place to 
encourage voluntary compliance. Many tax authorities in high-income countries aspire to 
achieving what is known as ‘cooperative compliance’ in their dealings with HNWIs. 
Cooperative compliance encourages regular interaction between the revenue authority and 
HNWIs (or their advisors), so that there is a consistent flow of information between the 
taxpayers and the tax authority, and mutual awareness of the issues relating to the taxpayer 
(OECD 2009). The goal of cooperative compliance is to develop a relationship of trust 
between the two parties, by ensuring that sensitive personal information relating to the 
taxpayer is safeguarded, that there is a well-developed legal framework in place (and 
taxpayers are informed of changes to this framework), and that the tax authority is impartial, 
responsive and competent in the manner in which it deals with the affairs of the taxpayer. 
Compliance, particularly among this group of taxpayers, can be significantly improved by 
providing them with timely and comprehensive guidance.  
 
To encourage a good working relationship between HMRC and HNWIs, and to increase 
voluntary compliance, HMRC ensures that customer relationship managers try to resolve 
issues before HNWIs submit their tax returns (National Audit Office 2016). These managers 
give HNWIs the HMRC’s position on a specific issue before the HNWI engages in a 
particular activity. If HMRC and the taxpayer fail to agree on a position, the HMRC 
undertakes a formal inquiry. If it finds that the HNWI was careless in their submissions, it 
may penalise the individual. However, sometimes penalties are suspended in order to 
encourage taxpayers to avoid similar mistakes in the future. In cases of suspected fraud, the 
matter is passed on to a specialist team, which determines whether there will be a criminal or 
civil investigation.  
 
How ATO treats HWIs depends on their behaviour. As is the case with HMRC, the ATO 
engages with these individuals before they file returns, in order to give them an opportunity to 
discuss their affairs and get ATO’s opinion (ATO response to questionnaire, 2016). Where 
individuals are perceived to be low risk, ATO’s approach is to educate them, guide them and 
provide them with the support that they need in filing their returns. If the ATO perceives an 
individual as having some degree of risk of non-compliance, it takes steps to manage the 
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risk. For example, it may decide to secure face-to-face meetings in which an individual is 
informed of what the ATO knows about their tax affairs, and given an opportunity to respond. 
Following this initial meeting, the ATO gives the individual a contact person who will deal with 
any subsequent issues. The inquiries may result in an individual being rated as high risk, in 
which case the ATO explores a variety of options for dealing with them, including audits, 
investigations by the crime unit, and working with law enforcement in the case of serious 
crime.  
 
Lastly, SARS takes a similar approach through its motto of education, service and 
enforcement (Interview with SARS officials, 2016). SARS aims to engage with all taxpayers 
by providing them with the required education and services to support their compliance. 
When education and service provision fail, enforcement action follows. 
 
So far, the URA is moving in the right direction. Officials in the HNWI/VIP unit informed us in 
an interview that:  
 
The VIP unit was formed as a sort of public relations arm. Our priority is to change the 
attitude of the people by giving them free advice. We do not begin by presenting 
ourselves as people who have come to enforce, even though that is our ultimate 
objective. When we go to VIPs, we tell them how the unit was formed and why it was 
formed. We inform them about their rights and obligations, and then tell them the 
information that we have about their commercial activities. 
 
This approach explains, at least in part, the success that the URA has achieved so far. 
However, as the graph below shows, there are risks of reduced compliance, particularly 
among VIPs.  
 
Figure 3 Compliance levels for HNWIs/VIPs 
 
Source: URA databases 
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integrity of the HNWI/VIP unit will thus be partly tested by its ability to enforce against those 
taxpayers who fail to comply with their obligations, even after the URA has educated them.  
 
One other issue that needs to be addressed is how to deal with past non-compliance. There 
are generally two kinds of taxpayers: those who will always be non-compliant, and those who 
are willing to be compliant but are uncertain of the consequences of disclosing non-
compliance (OECD 2009). For the first category, very little – if anything – can be done by the 
tax authority to encourage voluntary compliance. Enforcement through penalties is often the 
only option for this category. The second category can improve its compliance if there is 
some kind of assurance that the disclosure of non-compliance will not result in criminal 
charges, reputational damages (when non-compliance is publicised), future intensive audits, 
and inability to settle the interest and penalties associated with past non-compliance. One 
way of dealing with the second category is by putting in place a voluntary disclosure 
mechanism which consists of: 
 
a) Publishing a guide on the procedure to be followed when voluntarily disclosing past non-
compliance  
b) Ensuring that the information disclosed by taxpayers is kept confidential by putting in 
place a range of mechanisms including special legislative secrecy provisions, designating 
specific officials to have access to the disclosed information and operating a disclosure 
system via a banking system 
c) Publishing broad principles on the procedures that will be followed once information is 
disclosed, to assure taxpayers that disclosure of non-compliance does not necessarily 
result in the risk of more intensive monitoring and auditing of the business of the taxpayer 
d) Providing clarity on the penalties, interest or criminal prosecution, if any, that may result 
from the declaration and stating mitigating factors 
e) Providing a dedicated phone number that those wishing to disclose can call to have initial 
discussions with the revenue authority without the requirement of disclosing the 
taxpayer’s identity.  
(OECD 2009: 65-67) 
 
Voluntary disclosure programmes in South Africa, are clearly stipulated in legislation and 
publicly announced (Interview with SARS officials, 2016). SARS believes that these 
programmes have merit, and bring within the tax net cases of non-compliance that SARS 
may never have discovered, given the limited resources available for investigating non-
compliance.  
 
The URA should look into the merits of having voluntary disclosure mechanisms. However, if 
these mechanisms are to be introduced the mechanisms should be available to all categories 
of taxpayers, and not just HNWIs, to prevent a backlash from other taxpayers.  
 
 
5  What might other countries learn from 
URA’s experience? 
 
The URA’s experience provides many lessons, particularly for tax authorities in Africa. We 
summarise these below: 
 
 To tax a segment of the population that is economically and politically influential, it is 
important to have support from top management of the revenue authority. Both the URA’s 
Commissioner General and the Commissioner for Domestic Taxes have been committed 
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to ensuring that the decision to tax HNWIs is implemented. In some cases, these leaders 
have personally attended initial meetings with people identified as HNWIs. Other senior 
staff, at the level of Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, have been involved in 
developing the criteria for identifying HNWIs. 
 The identity of most HNWIs is publicly known. It has not been difficult for the URA to 
identify many of the most prominent. Initial information is cross-checked to ensure that 
people are not wrongly labelled as HNWIs. 
 Sometimes it is important to simply start with the little information available, without 
waiting until one has good definitions and comprehensive lists. The learning process is 
continuous, and definitions and lists can be revised along the way. 
 With will and intelligence, a tax authority can go ahead and make real progress without 
focussing too much on what other countries do. 
 Technical expertise is important. But communication skills are even more important in a 
country where the majority of HNWIs engage more in tax evasion than avoidance, and 
where they wield a lot of political influence. Officials in the HNWI unit are chosen for their 
ability to balance between being assertive and being respectful. They are also able to 
communicate tax matters in a simplified manner. 
 Initially, emphasis is placed on educating taxpayers about their rights and obligations. 
Enforcement comes later. 
 Identifying HNWIs requires close collaboration between the research function and the 
operational function. This allows for research findings to be tested in real time, and for the 
research, in turn, to be informed by what is happening in practice.  
 Government is one of the biggest consumers of good and services. HNWIs are likely to 
be engaged – directly or through their associates – in the provision of goods and services 
to government. The URA’s Public Sector Office, which monitors the award of government 
contracts, has been a good source of information on contracts entered into between the 
government and these individuals. 
 Elections may have an effect on revenue collection. HNWIs who are politicians are more 
likely to pay their taxes during election periods. Whether these payments continue after 
election periods cannot be guaranteed.  
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